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THE CLAYTON ACT'S NEW SECTION 7: A STORM
WARNING FOR THE MERGER PARADE*
To cope with monopolies and restraints of trade in their incipiency, Congress
passed the Clayton Act 1 condemning specific practices regarded as potentially
dangerous to competition.2 Section 7 prohibited acquisitions of stock by one
corporation in another where the effect "may be to substantially lessen com-
petition" between the two corporations, or "tend to create a monopoly."3
However, the section was emasculated by an unsympathetic judiciary.4
While verbally recognizing the legislated standard of reasonable probability
of harm to competition, courts actually required proof of certainty of harm.0
*Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus W, atch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), af'd, 20
F2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
1. 38 STAtT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44, IS U.S.C. § 412, 28 U.S.C. §§ 331-3,
396-90a, 29 U.S.C. §§ 53-4 (1946).
2. "Broadly stated the bill, in its treatment of unlawful restraints and monupolie ,
seeks to prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices which, as a rule, singly and
in themselves, are not covered by the act of July 2, 1890 [Sherman Act], or other existing
antitrust acts, and thus, by making these practices illegal, to arrest the creation of trusts,
conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation." SE,:. Rmr.
No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). For cases recognizing this purpose see Standard
Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 25S U.S. 346, 355-7 (1922) ; Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 282 Fed. 81 (3d Cir. 1922), aff'd sub noa. FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S.
463 (1923).
3. The section read in part as follows: "[N]o corporation engaged in commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce where the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stcck is
so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commarce
in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce."
38 STAT. 730, 731-2 (1914). A similar provision dealt with purchases of stock by holding
companies. And all purchases made solely for investment were specifically exempted
from the section. Id. at 732.
There is some dispute as to Congress' purpose in enacting this section. Comparc
Note, Section 7 of The Clayton Act: A Legislatv Histor,, 52 COi. L R.Ev. 766, 769
(1952), with H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1949).
4. See Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 613 (1948).
During the Senate debate which led to the adoption of the 1950 amendment, Senator
O'Conor, floor leader of the amendment, referred to the original § 7 as a "nullity" and
a "mockery of the ... law." 96 Co-;. Rnr. 16506 (1950). See also 95 Coa. Rrc. 11498,
11503 (1949).
5. This is the Sherman Act's standard of legality for intercorporate stockholding
and mergers. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (194S); United States
v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 10,
179 (1911) ; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 47 F.2d 2.M (FD. Ito. 1931). It vas
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And exceptions to the section were interpreted in a manner which prevented
effective enforcement of the underlying legislative policy.6
In 1950, Congress amended Section 7 7 to restore its effectiveness in the
struggle to maintain a competitive economy.8 The section was extended to
cover acquisitions of corporate assets. And legislative history discloses a
clear intent to reassert potentiality of harm to competition as the test of
legality under the amended section. 9 However, verbal similarities between
the old and new sections 10 have led to conflicting interpretations 11 of the
read into the Clayton Act by the Third Circuit in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 282 Fed. 81
(3d Cir. 1922), aff'd sub non. FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923)
(§ 3 decision). This was approved by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co, v.
FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930) (§ 7 decision). For a classic example of the application
of the Sherman Act standard to a § 7 proceeding, see United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935).
6. Judicial handling of the asset loophole was typical. The original section did not
specifically refer to acquisitions of assets. Thus while company A might not be able
to buy the stock of company B where the result might be to substantially lessen competi-
tion, company A could purchase all the assets of company B without violating § 7.
United States v. Celanese Corp., 91 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). The courts widened
this loophole by holding that the section could not be used to prevent the use of illegal
stock acquisitions as an intermediate device in acquiring the assets of a competitor. FTC
v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554, 561 (1926). And in Arrow-Hart & Hegeman
Electric Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934), the Supreme Court held that where the de-
fendant used its stock control to acquire the physical assets of a competitor, the FTC
could not order divestiture of the assets although the stock was admittedly purchased
in violation of § 7, and the Commission had begun proceedings against the stock purchases
prior to the acquisition of assets.
7. 64 STAT. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. 1952). The amendment is often
referred to as the Celler Anti-Merger Act.
8. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81 Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) passim; S.N. RE,. No. 1775,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) passim.
9. See, e.g., id. at 4-5: "[I]t is the purpose of this legislation to assure a broader
construction of the more fundamental provisions that are retained than has been given
in the past. The committee wish to make it clear that the bill is not intended to revert
to the Sherman Act test. The intent here, as in other parts of the Clayton Act, is to
cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have attained
such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding." (emphasis supplied). Similar
statements were made by the House Judiciary Committee. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1949).
These statements are particularly significant in view of testimony by the General
Counsel of the FTC urging Congress to specify its intent to establish a stricter standard
of legality than the courts had read into the old section. Hearings before Senate Sub-
committee of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 2734, 81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
24-6 (1949-50).
10. The amended section prohibits intercorporate stock or asset acquisitions "where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 64 STAT. 1125-6 (1950),
15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. 1952). Compare the original section quoted supra note 3.
The vagueness of the new standard was emphasized by Senator Donnell in his
minority report on the bill. SEN. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 19-23 (1950).
11. See e.g., Neal, The Clayton Act and the Transamerica Case, 5 STAN. L. Ruv.
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new test. Therefore, judicial construction of the amendment has been eagerly
awaited.
12
In Hamilton Watch Co. v. Bcnrus Watch Co.' 3 the amended section was
construed for the first time.14 Early in 1952 Benrus began making heavy
purchases of Hamilton stock. When Hamilton learned of this, its officers,
directors, and major stockholders formed a voting trust which accumulated
sufficient common stock to insure working control of the corporation. Mean-
while, Benrus purchased enough stock to guarantee, through cumulative
179, 187-90, 229-30 (1953); Comment, Amendint to § 7 of the Clayton Act, 46 ILL L.
REv. 444, 453-4 (1951); Note, Section 7 Of The Clayton Act: A Legislath.'? History,
52 Coi. L. REv% 766, 776-7 (1952) ; Note, 64 HLmv. L. REv. 1212-4 (1951).
12. The importance of the amendment to businessmen can hardly be overestimated
in the light of the great number of mergers which have occurred since its pascage, and
which are planned for the near future. See, e.g., Company Mcrgcrs: How, llhy, Business
Week, Mar. 7, 1953, p. 29; Trying To Figure Wfhere The Shoe Industry Is Going, id., July
25, 1953, p. 138; Merger Mechanics: You Have To Try Them To Know If They'll
Work, id., Aug. 8, 1953, p. 96; Earthmovhng: Everyone Gets In The Act, id., Aug. 15,
1953, p. 56; Industrial Truck Makers Get Merger Fever, id., Sept. 26, 1953, p. 110.
The amendment is of equal importance to those alarmed at the high and increasing
concentration of economic power in our society. Although there is some dispute among
economists as to the contribution of mergers to this phenomenon, compare Burmps,
LIxTr-xR & Ckny, CoRoraxrE -EaGErs c. 9 (1951), uith FEDzEnL TrLuz ComxnusslO.z
THE M IERGER MovE::in A SurmLA.Ry REroRT (194S), there can be no doubt that
Congress thought it was dealing with this problem when it passed the amendment.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949): "Such in general outline
is the broad economic problem of high and increasing [economic] concentration ,,ith
which this legislation is concerned."
13. 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
14. The first case arising under the amended section wvas Fargo Glass & Paint Co.
v. Globe American Corp., 201 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1953), reversing 101 F. Supp. 410 (N.D.
Ill. 1951). The Seventh Circuit, without any discussion of the meaning of the amendled
section, held that it had not been violated since the company involved manufactured lvks
than 2 percent of the relevant product in an industry in which the 10 leading manufac-
turers manufactured approximately 52 percent of the national total. The decision actually
turned on the definition of the relevant product. Comnpare the trial court opinion on
this point, 101 F. Supp. at 464-5, with that of the Court of Appeals, 201 F2d at 537-8.
The only complaint the FTC has issued under the amended section is against Pills-
bury 'Mills, Inc., for buying up Ballard & Ballard, a Louisville milling company, and
Duff's Baking Mix Division of American Home Products Corp. The hearing examiner
dismissed the complaint without prejudice on two grounds: a) the industry statistics
were unreliable and b) even if they were reliable, the evidence produced by the FTC
counsel in support of the complaint was insufficient to raise a prima facie case of .iolatfin.
Initial Decision, Pillsbury Mills, Inc., FTC Dkt. 6000 (April 22, 1953). Mthough the
decision may be supported on the first ground mentioned above, but see Edwvards, The
Effects of Mergers Upon Competition in MARKETING: CURRENT Pomv-is A D Tnax s
48, 49-50 (1952), the second ground seems clearly invalid. Counsel in support of the
complaint not only met the test suggested p. 240 infra, but also made a rule of reason
type analysis of the factors relevant to the effectiveness of competition within the relevant
industries. Brief for Appellant, pp. 45-58, 59-61, Pillsbury Mills, Inc., FTC Dkt. 6000
(April 22, 1953). The hearing examiner's order is now on appeal within the Commission.
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voting, minority representation on Hamilton's board of directors. To prevent
Benrus from voting its stock, Hamilton brought suit claiming that Benrus'
purchases violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Judge Hincks granted a
preliminary injunction on the ground that minority representation of Benrus
on Hamilton's board of directors would create just such a threat to competi-
tion as the amended section was designed to prohibit.'5 The Second Circuit
affirmed.' 6
Benrus argued that its stock purchases were specifically sanctioned by a
provision, retained in the 1950 amendment, exempting stock purchases made
solely for investment. 17 In a leading pre-amendment decision, the Third Cir-
cuit held that this exception applied to a case in which one railroad had
acquired one-half of the stock in a competing road, and one-third of the stock
in another, and had elected several of its employees to their boards of directors,
The court stated that without an actual substantial lessening of competition or
an actual intent to bring this about, the stock purchases were made solely for
investment within the meaning of the Act.' 8 Such reasoning seems clearly
to have ignored the object of the Clayton Act. To require proof of actual
harm to competition is incompatible with Congressional efforts to supple-
ment the Sherman Act by reaching restraints of trade in their incipiency and
before consummation.'" The primary consideration should be the probability
of harm to competition. 20 And the intent of the acquiring firm is relevant only
as one factor affecting that probability. Stock purchases made solely for in-
vestment purposes were exempted from the original Section 7 because Con-
gress felt that such purchases could not raise an inference of a reasonable
probability of harm to competition.21 Courts should not extend the exemption
15. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 316-17 (D. Conn.
1953). Judge Hincks also held that acquisition of a competitor's stock violates the
amended section when the acquisitions are made pursuant to a plan to obtain control, the
success of which at the time of the acquisition was likely, and which if successful would
probably result in a substantial lessening of competition. He found all these elements
present in the instant case and held that they were an alternative ground for granting
the preliminary injunction. Id. at 316.
16. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
17. "This section shall not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely for
investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting
to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition." 64 STAT. 1126 (1950), 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (Supp. 1952).
18. Pennsylvania R.R. v. ICC, 66 F.2d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1933), aff'd without opinion
by an equally divided court, 291 U.S. 651 (1934). Cf. Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. FTC,
51 F.2d 656, 661 (3d Cir. 1931).
19. See SEN. REP. No. 1175, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950).
20. See note 2 supra.
21. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1914). Stock purchases made
solely for investment, but whose inherent tendency is to lessen competition to a sub-
stantial degree, can be attacked under the Sherman Act. Cf. Shotkin v. General Electric
Co., 171 F.2d 236, 238 (10th Cir. 1948).
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to purchases made only partially for investment purposes when such a proba-
bility results. 22  In Benrus Judge Hincks apparently adopted this line of
reasoning. The court found that Benrus' purchases were an investment hedge
against the possible loss of Swiss imports.2 3 But control of Hamilton was also
an objective of those purchases 24 and the court therefore held the exception
inapplicable. On this point Benrus clearly recognizes that the test of legality
under amended Section 7 is potentiality of harm to competition.
The court's emphasis on potentiality of harm to competition is seen even
more clearly in its holding that minority representation of Benrus on Hamil-
ton's board of directors would violate Section 7. In a recent case brought
under the original section the Third Circuit held, following pre-amendment
decisions on this point,25 that "the mere showing of common ownership [of
ten competing banks] will not support an inferential finding that competition
22. It is not necessary to overrule the Pennsylvania R.R. case to reach this con-
clusion. That case may be distinguished on the ground that the court faund that the
purchases were made solely, for investment because the "evidence shows that railroad
companies generally invest a substantial part of their surplus in securities of companies
constituting members of the family group which make up the system of the purchasing
company. This was the custom both before and after the passage of the Clayton Act...."
Pennsylvania R.R. v. ICC, 66 F2d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1933), aff'd without opfnion by an
equallt, divided court, 291 U.S. 651 (1934). Furthermore, the case was decided during
the depression and the court must have been influenced by the the fact that "to force all
this stock suddenly upon the market might have such a disastrous effect in these troublous
times. . . " Ibid.
23. Benrus has no domestic watch movement facilities; it imports its movements
from its plant in Switzerland. Hamilton's entire plant is domestic. There is now-and
there has been since last year- a strong movement to raise the tariffs on importcd
movements. There is also the danger that war might break out and cut off Benrus'
imports from Switzerland. If either event should occur, the value of Hamilton's stoe:
would increase tremendously since its main competitors (four of the Blix Six watch
companies who depend on Swiss imports) would lose a substantial part of their market
to Hamilton. Benrus' stock purchases in Hamilton were thus to some extent an invest-
ment hedge against a rise in tariffs or an outbreak of hostilities. Hamilton Watch Co. v.
Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 313 (D. Conn. 1953).
24. Judge Hincks' finding was based mainly on the following considerations: Benrus
spent over $1,300,000 for the Hamilton stock, much of which appears to have been bor-
rowed. It had often paid premium prices for the stock while a pure investment policy
would have been pursued with more patience. It sold, at a loss, a sizeable investment
in Elgin (another domestic producer) during the period it vas buying the Hamilton
stock; yet during this period Elgin's business was booming while Hamilton was running
at a loss and had passed its first dividend since the beginning of World War II. Benrus
ceased purchasing Hamilton stock once it became apparent that the voting trust, at least
for the time being, had consolidated control of Hamilton. In addition, Benrus plainly
evidenced its hostility to the voting trust from the time of its organization and at one
time offered to refrain from voting Benrus stock for one year if the trust were dissolved.
Id. at 313, 316.
25. Pennsylvania R.R. v. ICC, 66 F.2d 37, 38-9 (3d Cir. 1933), aff'd uithout opinion
by an equally divided court, 291 U.S. 651 (1934) ; Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. FTC,
51 F.2d 656, 661 (3d Cir. 1931).
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between them .. may be lessened." 26 But, in Benrus, Judge Hincks declared
that mere minority representation on a competitor's board of directors would
violate Section 7 "because of the opportunity thereby afforded to persuade or
compel a relaxation of the full vigor" of the latter's competitive activity. 1
The major unsolved problem under the amended section is the plaintiff's
burden of proof.2 8 The pre-amendment cases did recognize that reasonable
probability of harm to competition was the Clayton Act test of legality.-"
But the courts refused to find a reasonable probability of harm to competition,
unless the defendant's actions violated the Sherman Act's rule of reason1'0
They obliterated the difference between the Sherman and Clayton Act stand-
ards of legality by imposing a similar burden of proof on the plaintiff regard-
less of the difference in the verbal standards which the statutes apparently
embodied.31 Yet if the Clayton Act's policy is to be made effective, the
burden of proof on the plaintiff must be lighter in a Clayton Act proceeding
than in a Sherman Act proceeding. The Supreme Court has said, referring to
Section 3, that the Clayton Act's specific statutory prohibitions represent a
clearly defined public policy which dispenses with the necessity of difficult
standards of economic proof.32 Thus, in the Standard Stations case the Court
held that a reasonable probability of substantial harm to competition would be
26. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 206
F.2d 163, 168 (3d Cir. 1953).
27. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 317 (D. Conti.
1953) (emphasis supplied).
28. Commentators agree on the interpretation to be given other elements of tile
amendment. For conflicting conclusions on the burden of proof issue see authorities cited
note 11 supra.
29. E.g., Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357 (1922);
International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930); Pennsylvania R.R. v. ICC,
66 F.2d 37, 38-9 (3d Cir. 1933), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided court, 291
U.S. 651 (1934) ; Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 282 Fed. 81, 86-7 (3d Cir. 1922), aff'd sub
nomn. FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
30. "[I]n determining whether given acts . . . substantially lessen competition and
tend to create a monopoly within the meaning of the Clayton Act, the only standard of
legality with which we are acquainted is the standard established . . . by the courts
in construing the Sherman Act .. " Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 282 Fed. 81, 86-7 (3d
Cir. 1922), aff'd sub nora. FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923). See also
note 5 supra.
31. See Schwartz, Potential hIpairment of Competition--The Impact of Standard
Oil of Cal. v. United States on the Standard Of Legality under the Clayton Act, 98 U.
OF PA. L. Rxv. 10, 33 (1949).
32. See, e.g., the Supreme Court's recent discussion of this point in Times-Picayune
Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). "While the Clayton Act's more specike
standards illuminate the public policy which the Sherman Act was designed to subserve
... the Government here must measure up to the more stringent law.... ." Id. at 609-10.
"To be sure, economic statistics are easily susceptible to legerdemain, and only the
organized context of all relevant factors can validly translate raw data into logical
cause and effect. But we must take the record as we find it, and hack through the jungle
as best we can . .. [because] this suit was not brought to adjudicate a trade practice
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inferred automatically from proof that the challenged exclusive dealer con-
tracts affected a substantial share of the relevant line of commerce.C The
main difficulty with this quantitative substantiality doctrine is that the prac-
tice involved may actually increase rather than decrease the vigor of competi-
tion.34 Therefore, the use of an irrebuttable presumption of illegality, on a
showing that a substantial share of the relevant line of commerce is affected,
will occasionally decrease the effectiveness of competition in the relevant
market.
The Section 7 standard of legality should combine the judicial insights
embodied in the Sherman Act rule of reason and the doctrine of quantitative
substantiality. The scope of the inquiry in a Section 7 case should be similar
to that undertaken in cases involving Sherman Act violations: all the elements
... banned by specific statutory prohibitions which by a clearly defined pr.'b!ic policy
dispense with difficudt standards of economic proof." Id. at 621-2 (emphasis supplied).
In the modern leading case on § 3, the Court went to great lengths to t.:plain its
decision on the plaintiff's burden of proof. "To interpret that section as requiring proof
that competition has actually diminished would make its very e. plicitness a means of
conferring immunity upon the practices which it singles out.... It seems hardly likely
that having with one hand set up an express prohibition against a practice thought to
be beyond the reach of the Sherman Act, Congress meant, with the othcr hand, to
reestablish the necessity of meeting the same tests of detriment to the public interest
as that Act had been interpreted as requiring.... To insist upon such an investigation
would be to stultify the force of Congress' declaration that requirements contracts are
to be prohibited whenever their effect 'may be' to substantially lessen competit n."
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 311-13 (1949) (emphasis supplied).
This argument certainly applies with equal force to § 7 which prohibits inter-
corporate stockholding and mergers wfheniceer their effect may be to lessen competiion
substantially. And the Supreme Court has already recognized that the standard of
legality under § 7 should be similar to the standard of § 3. It was in a § 3 case that the
Sherman Act's rule of reason was first read into the Clayton Act. Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 282 Fed. 81 (3d Cir. 1922), aff'd sub norm. FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S.
463 (1923). And the Court cited § 3 cases as precedent when it read that rule into § 7.
International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 293 (1930). It would thus be particularly
appropriate for the Court to use the standard it has recently established under § 3 as a
guide to the standard it should establish under § 7.
33. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949): "We conclude,
therefore, that the qualifying clause [may be to substantially lessen competition] of § 3
is satisfied by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line
of commerce affected... "' See also United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 9) F. Supp.
280, 2836 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952). This quantitative sub-
stantiality test of § 3 was recently approved in Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953): "Where the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the
market for the 'tying' product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the 'tied'
product is restrained, a tying arrangement violates the narrower standards expressed in
§ 3 of the Clayton Act because from either factor the requisite potential lessening of
competition is inferred." (court's emphasis).
34. See Lockhart & Sacks, Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining w!dethcr
Exclusive Arrangenwats Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 I-Ihv. L Ra-. 913
(1952).
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affecting competition should be examined in order to determine whether the
particular intercorporate stockholding or merger creates a reasonable proba-
bility of harm to what economists refer to as the "workability" or "effective-
ness" of competition within the relevant industry. 5 But no one can say with
certainty what will produce "workable" or "effective" competition.8 0 It is
generally agreed, however, that the effectiveness of competition usually varies
directly with the number of sellers in the market.37 Thus once the plaintiff
has shown that a merger affects a substantial share of the relevant market, the
risk of non-persuasion should be placed on the defendant to prove that in the
particular industry involved the significant reduction in the number of sellers
will not decrease the effectiveness of competition.38
35. Such an inquiry is called for in order to avoid prohibiting those intercorporate
stockholdings and mergers which increase rather than decrease the workability of compe-
tition. Cf. Hefleblower, Economics of Size, 24 J. OF BUSINESS OF U. OF Cm. 253, 259-60,
265-8 (1951) ; Sunderland, Changing Legal Concepts, 24 id. at 235, 249-52; Adelman, Busi-
ness Size & Public Policy, 24 id. at 269, 277-9; Edwards, supra note 14, at 52. It is also
called for by clearly expressed Congressional intent. "It is expected that, in the admnin-
tration of the act, full consideration will be given to all matters bearing upon the main-
tenance of competition, including the circumstances giving rise to the acquisition." SEN.
REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950).
Such an inquiry is to be expected in proceedings brought by the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. See New Antitrust Policy Developing, Busi-
ness Week, Aug. 1, 1953, p. 62; Address Of Chairman Howrey, FTC Clip Sheet, June 15,
22, 1953; Oppenheim On Antitrust Group, id., July 16, 1953.
And there is already precedent that refusal to admit such evidence in a § 7 proceeding
constitutes reversable error. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System, 206 F2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1953).
36. "Workable competition" is the cardinal shibboleth of modern economic analysis.
The concept was first introduced by Clark as a healthy antidote to the classical econo-
mists' disregard of the actualities of the market place. Clark, Towards a Concept of
Workable Competition, 30 Am. EcoN. REv. 241 (1940). But the concept has never gone
beyond the stage of theoretical validity; there has been as yet insufficient empirical
analysis of actual industrial structures to give the concept detailed content. Thus one
of the leading "modern" economists has recently concluded that "there are as many
definitions of 'effective' or 'workable' competition as there are 'effective' or 'workable'
economists." Mason, The New Competition, 43 YALE R v. 37, 48 (1953). See also
Wilcox, Discussion, 40 Am. EcoN. REv. Supp. 100 (1950) ; Bain, Workable Competition
in Oligopoly: Theoretical Considerations and Some Empirical Evidence, 40 id. at 35, 37
(1950) ; Carlston, Vertical Integration and the Law in VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN MARu-
KETING, 148, 168-9 (Cole ed. 1952) ; Edwards, supra note 14, at 59.
37. STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND Frm ENTERPRISE, cc. 4, 5 (1951);
Bowman, Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 577, 631-41 (1953). The
theory underlying this conclusion is analyzed in FEU.NER, CoMPETnTON AMONG TnE
Faw (1949). Cf. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION c. 4 (1949); BREms, PRoDucr
EqUIIIBRIUM UNDER MONOPOLISTC COMPETITION (1951). This theory was one of the
reasons that led to the amendment of § 7. SEN. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950).
38. See Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Antitrust Policy, 50 MicH. L. REv. 1139, 1158-61, 1179-81, 1196-8 (1952); HANDLER, A
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The Benrius case suggests that courts may use such a rebuttable presump-
tion in Section 7 cases. Judge Hincks held that, unless a merger between
Benrus and Hamilton would create a reasonable probability of harm to com-
petition, the preliminary injunction would have to be denied. But this test
was satisfied by a showing that the companies involved controlled a substantial
share 39 of the relevant line of commerce.- ° However, such a showing did
not create an irrebuttable presumption of illegality; it merely made out the
prima facie case of violation of Section 7 necessary to support a preliminary
injunction. 41 The Second Circuit's affirmance emphasized that only a prima
facie case of violation had been made out in the court below .42 Thus both
S'rTUY oF THE CONSTRUCTION A D EFORCzmENT OF THE FEM, X.ZR ANTITausT Lav-ws S9
(TNEC Monograph 38, 1940) ; Bowman, supra note 37, at 589-90, 61-41; Bain, susra vote
36, at 46-7; STOcKING & WVATKINS, fMONOPOLY AND FREE E n-ui sE 5E0-3, E564 (1951).
39. Judge Hincks held that the relevant line of commerce was the natiunal market
in jeweled watches. On a unit basis he found that Hamilton sold 6 percent and Benrus 9
percent of the jeweled watches sold in the United States in 1950. The figures were slightly
lower for 1951 and 1952. It is significant that he held this to comprise a substantial share of
the relevant market despite the fact that Elgin and Bulova ead sold mt.re than Benrus
and Hamilton combined. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307.
310-11, 315 (D. Conn. 1953).
What constitutes a substantial share of the market should depend on the type of
merger under consideration. The percentage relevant for vertical integration should L-
the same held determinative for exclusive dealer contracts under § 3 of the Act since
vertical integration is at least as basic a restraint on competition as that imposed by such
contracts. The percentage relevant for horizontal mergers should depend on the number
of firms reasonably necessary for effective competition. A tentative analysis suggests
that whenever the firm resulting from the merger controls 10 percent of the relevant
market, there should arise a rebuttable presumption of illegality. Sce Bain, supra note 36,
at 46-7; Bowman, supra note 37, at 638-41. The figure relevant for conglomerate mergers
is tied up with the general problem of the giant concern. See Ern\voArs, MAINTAINING
ConriroN 99-121, 130-2, 142-4 (1949).
40. This was the essence of Hamilton's argument in the Memorandum of Law which
it submitted to Judge Hincks. He found himself "persuaded by the reasoning and citations
appearing in plantiff's briefs." Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp.
307, 315 (D. Conn. 1953).
41. Hamilton repeatedly argued that only a prima facie case of violation is necessary
to support a preliminary injunction and that the main purpose of a preliminary injunction
is to maintain the status quo until a case can be decided on its merits. Plaintiff's Brief
on the Preliminary Injunction, pp. 18-29, Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co.,
114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn. 1953) ; Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief on Appeal, pp. 14-15, 30,
Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 73S (2d Cir. 1953). That Hamiltoa
recognized that a rule of reason analysis would be admissible at the full hearing is clear
from the following quote from its appeal brief: "The urgency of the need for preliminary
relief precluded plaintiff from developing and presenting the full competitze irmplications
of the Benrus acquisition. . . . These matters, of necessity, must await final hearing.
it was sufficient for the purpose of the preliminary relief sought that plaintiff establish
a prima facie case of Section 7 violation... ." Id. at 30 (emphasis supplied).
42. All that the record disclosed, declared the court of appeals, was that the lower
"court, after a trial, may be required to conclude that Benrus w.-as not innozent of a
Section 7 violation." Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F2d 738, 740 (2d
1953]
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courts left open the door to a rule of reason analysis by which the defendant
could rebut the presumption of illegality raised by the evidence presented to
the lower court.
The effectiveness of the antitrust laws depends ultimately upon the attitude
of the courts in applying their broad generalities to specific fact situations. 4A
The original Section 7 was destroyed by courts which rarely refused to ac-
cept arguments of business expediency.44 The Benrus case suggests that the
amended section will fare much better at the hands of the judiciary. It not
only reaffirms potentiality of harm to competition as the standard of legality
under Section 7 but suggests a restricted burden of proof on the plaintiff
which will encourage vigorous enforcement of the section without prohibiting
those intercorporate stockholdings and mergers which increase rather than
decrease the effectiveness of competition.
Cir. 1953) (emphasis supplied). The court went out of its way to emphasize that Judge
Hincks' conclusions of law as well as fact were only "interlocultory, tentative, provisional,
ad interim, impermanent, mutable, not fixed or final or conlusive, characterized by its
for-the-time-beingness." Id. at 742.
43. Loevinger, Antitrust and the New Economics, 37 MINN. L. R'v. 505, 568 (1953).
44. Schwartz, supra note 31, at 33.
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